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RESPONSE TO CONDLIN'S CRITIQUE OF
TRANSFORMATIVE MEDIATION
Robert A. Baruch Bush and Joseph P. Folger*
We welcome thoughtful critical analysis of the transformative
framework because we believe such comments further substantive
discussion and debate. Some prior critiques of the framework have
been beneficial in helping to clearly map the ideological divide in
the ADR field-a divide that separates very different approaches
to conflict intervention. Cogent and honestly substantiated
critiques of the transformative approach have strengthened the discourse about conflict intervention practice by building stronger arguments on all sides of the debate over the various goals and
expectations for mediation.'
Unfortunately, the recent article by Robert Condlin in this
Journal2 advances none of these useful goals, for two main reasons.
First, the tone and style of a scholarly piece-and communication
in general-matter greatly to its substantive impact. We and many
other colleagues have devoted our professional lives over the past
two decades to the serious development of this work. To treat
these efforts with such disdain and mockery in a public context, as
Condlin does, is deeply disrespectful and injurious. We believe
people can legitimately disagree but still be connected as respectful
and respected human beings.
Second, this critique effectively seeks to marginalize others'
views rather than have measured dialogue and debate about them.
The critique as a whole is built on a selective and self-serving literature review, outright misrepresentation of the underlying theory
that supports transformative practice, and spurious arguments
* The authors are, respectively, Rains Distinguished Professor of Law at the Maurice A. Deane School of Law, Hofstra University, and Professor of Adult and Organizational Development, Temple University, as well as co-authors of THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION: THE
TRANSFORMATIVE APPROACH TO CONFLICT and co-founders of the Institute for the Study of
Conflict Transformation.

I See, e.g., Neal Milner, Mediation and Political Theory: A Critique of Bush and Folger, 21
L. & Soc'L INQUIRY 737, 750 (1996); Michael Williams, Can'tI Get No Satisfaction? Thoughts on
The Promise of Mediation, 15 MEDIATION Q. 143, 145, 149 (1997); Jeffrey R. Seul, How Transformative Is Transformative Mediation?:A Constructive-DevelopmentalAssessment, 15 OHIo ST.
J. ON DIsP. RESOL.135 (1999).

2 Robert Condlin, The Curious Case of TransformativeDispute Resolution: An Unfortunate
Marriageof Intransigence,Exclusivity, and Hype, 14 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 621 (2013).
3 See infra, note 9 and accompanying text, discussing this disdainful treatment in detail.
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about the empirical research on transformative mediation.' For us
to respond in a comprehensive way would require a complete reiteration of the transformative mediation literature, because Condlin
misrepresents a large portion of that work and ignores parts that
are inconsistent with his personal views.5 Therefore, a full response is simply not warranted.
However, we do want to comment on what appears to be the
motivation for this critique of transformative mediation.6
Condlin's recent career as a critic of ADR has targeted the work of
many leading contributors to the ADR literature, including the primary authorities on integrative bargaining, social science and negotiation, and feminist theory.7 And, in each case, his critique
4 See infra notes 19-27 and accompanying text for some specific examples.
5 Genuinely interested readers can examine that work and decide for themselves the
strengths or weaknesses of Condlin's charges. See ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION: RESPONDING To CONFLICT THROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND
RECOGNITION 242-48, 255-56 (1994) [hereinafter, Promise 1]; ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH &
JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION: THE TRANSFORMATIVE APPROACH TO CON-

FLicT

59-62, 250-56 (2ND ED. 2005) [hereinafter, Promise2]. Apart from these two core works,
which are consistently misrepresented in Condlin's critique, the most readily available source of
reliable information on the transformative framework is a recent edited volume, TRANSPORMATIVE MEDIATION: A SOURCEBOOK (2010) [hereinafter SOURCEBOOK], which contains two dozen

chapters on the theory, practice and applications of transformative conflict intervention. Many
other materials are cited in the Sourcebook's well-footnoted chapters, including dozens of articles published in major journals. Finally, a downloadable annotated bibliography on the transformative framework can be found online, on the website of the Institute for the Study of
Conflict Transformation, available at http://www.transformativemediation.org/resources/bibliography-of-resources [last visited on June 24, 2013]. Regarding Condlin's views on conflict resolution processes and their underlying premises, see infra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
6 Another reason for our responding to Condlin's article are the questions being raised by
those who quickly turned away from the article and were puzzled and disturbed by its extreme
rhetoric. See infra note 9, for examples of this rhetoric. Colleagues have asked about Condlin's
motive for writing this piece (and, frankly, the Journal's role in publishing it in this form). They
are particularly puzzled by the derisive, mocking tone that runs through the essay. They ask,
why would someone use this tone in a scholarly critique of a model of conflict intervention
practice? Graduate students have told us directly that they started reading the article and after
four or five pages, they simply stopped. The inaccuracies, excessive negativity, and derisive tone
of the essay made them question both the credibility of the content and the author's motives for
writing it. Our response here suggests what those motives may be.
7 See Robert Condlin, Bargaining Without Law, 56 NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL L. REV. 281

(2012) [hereinafter, Bargaining];

-,

Legal BargainingTheory's New "Prospecting"Agenda:

It May Be Social Science, But Is It News?, 10 PEPPERDINE Disp. RESOL. L. J., 215 (2010) [herein-

, Bargaining with a Hugger: The Weaknesses and Limits of a Commuafter, Prospecting];
nitarian Conception of Legal Dispute Bargaining, or Why We Can't All Just Get Along, 9
, Every Day and in
CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 301 (2008) [hereinafter, Hugger]; _
Every Way, We are All Becoming Meta and Meta: Or How Communitarian Bargaining Theory
Conquered the World (of Bargaining Theory)[hereinafter, Meta], 23 OHIo STATE J. ON DIsP.
RESOL. 231 (2008).
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appears designed to make his chosen subject appear not merely
wrong, but also foolish.8 The aim of his work seems to be
marginalization, not measured deliberation and debate. This approach pervades all of Condlin's articles on ADR, and his critique
of transformative mediation in this Journal's previous issue (Volume 14, Issue 3) takes it to a new level. Throughout the article, he
employs a litany of sarcastic rhetoric to suggest that the theorists
and practitioners of this model of mediation are naive fools or
worse-"carnival barkers" with "utopian fantasies," to use his
words. 9
8 See, e.g., Condlin, Prospecting,supra note 7, at 265 ["The point seems to be that bargainers should be ambitious, pursue ambitions diligently, and exploit ignorance and inexperience
when they have the chance. This will not come as a shock to most lawyers. One might conclude,
paraphrasing Horace, that 'the mountain has labored mightily and brought forth a mouse'. . . .
None of these lessons are controversial or counterintuitive. . . . It is like telling an adult to look
both ways before crossing the street."]; Condlin, Hugger, supra note 7, at 3-5 [Communitarian
bargainers create a kind of dispute-settlement Nirvana (or Eden) where self-interest is not naked, force is not brutish, entitlement claims are not legalistic, and everyone acts in the spirit and
to the limits of her or his social potential. This is a wonderfully inspiring story, full of nobility and
grandeur, and it would be a source of great comfort in an unfriendly and fractious world if it
were true. But sadly, the assumptions communitarian bargaining theory makes about legal disputing are ... based on a vision of humans before the fall."]; Condlin, Meta, supra note 7, at 239
[Professor Menkel-Meadow's article ... is the Bible of communitarian bargaining and its NinetyFive Theses as well.], 250 ["In ... communitarian normative argument ... a catchy story with a
clever and non-obvious outcome is used to show how a seemingly intractable bargaining problem was made to give way in the face of imaginative, communal thinking. . . . Collectively, these
stories make up a set of bargaining parables that offer folksy accounts of practical bargaining
wisdom. Like fairy tales, the stories all have morals intended to produce epiphanies rather than
skeptical reflection, and also like fairy tales, they suffer when examined closely."]. Other examples of similar tone are found in all these articles.
9 For specific examples of his use of sarcasm and even ridicule in his attack on transformative mediation, including the terms quoted in the text, see Condlin, supra note 2, at 629 ["The
wishful and grandiose nature of these claims might make them seem somewhat Panglossian,
reminiscent of the arguments for Soviet and Chinese five year plans, designed societies, perfectible humans, and other utopian fantasies" (emphasis added)]; fn. 28 ["'Strength' is a recurring
theme in B&F's description of TDR. It is as if they wanted to neutralize an anticipated objection
to the Theory (that TDR behavior will look weak to an experienced negotiator) by appropriating the terminology of the objection and claiming it as their own. This is a familiar rhetorical
stratagem. Contemporary examples include Fox News calling itself 'fair and balanced,' or the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union calling its official newspaper Truth (Pravda)."]; fn 110
["The 'Pontius Pilate' philosophy at the heart of the concept of Empowerment is illustrated
nicely by a transformative mediation joke. Question: 'How many [TDR] mediators does it take
to change a light bulb? . . . [A]nswer: None.' Even this does not capture the full force of TDR's
non-interventionist commitment. The punch line should read: 'None. Light bulbs change themselves."']; fn. 129 ["TDR proponents are not above airbrushing . . . imperfections out of their
mediation stories. . . . Janet Malcolm is the most prominent proponent of this questionable empirical reporting practice, having been found to have deliberately altered the content of statements attributed to Jeffrey Masson in a NEW YORKER magazine article to make the statement
say what Malcolm thought they should."]; 661 ["The parties' discussion of the "deep" issue in
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Our aim here is to suggest what we think is the reason for this
polarizing, exaggerated critique. We believe it lies in Condlin's intense opposition to-and scorn for-the values and beliefs that he
sees underlying the transformative theory (and, to a lesser degree,
the other work he has criticized in the past). He believes firmly
that the adversarial process-including adversarial negotiation and
adversarial litigation-is the best way to address conflict effectively.10 To him, "communitarian" and "transformative" processes
dispute [in the case presented in Promise 2, supra note 51-whether the . . . objection to the
purple color was racist-is little more than a Sixties set piece of the sort Tom Wolfe mocked in
his depiction of the San Francisco OEO office in RADICAL CHIC & MAU-MAUING THE FLAK
CATCHERs."]; 664 ["Notwithstanding its detours, impasses, asides, and dead ends, the mediation
[case presented in Promise 2] played out pretty much the way TDR proponents say it should
have, right up to the predictable happy ending. For all of B&F's efforts at verisimilitude, the
story looks like all of their other stories, just a lot longer, and with a lot more drama. Think of it
as a mediation opera without the music."]; fn. 235 ["When I describe the movement as evangelical, I have in mind the revivalist-rhetorical properties of evangelism and not its doctrinal ones.
Like Chautauqua preachers, TDR proponents speak in loud, certain terms, admit no qualification or questioning, reject non-conforming views out of hand, and proselytize with the enthusiasm of a carnival barker (emphasis added)]; 678 ["One might think over-exaggerating the
benefits of a dispute resolution theory was no longer possible after the publication of Getting to
Yes. That book raised the hoopla standard so high it seemed it would not be equaled within
twenty-one years of a life-in-being in 1981, but Getting to Yes brought sophisticated scholarship
in low-visibility fields to the attention of a wider audience, and its authors' adjectival excesses
were forgiven for that reason. Sadly, TDR has no such saving grace."]; 679 ["The Theory is
popular within certain circles, to be sure, but this popularity, like that of the T-Group in the
1960s and 1970s, seems based more on the allure of a simple, one-size-fits-all, psychological
template for personal learning and growth, and the opportunity to participate in an evangelical,
intellectualist movement of the moment, than it does on the discovery of a definitive new account of disputing. It is a popularity based on optimism, fashion, and hope more than on critical
judgment, and popularity of this sort tends to be ephemeral. . . . Somewhere, the ghosts of
Santayana and Marx must be chuckling."] Other examples abound, but those quoted here are
enough to give the flavor of Condlin's approach to "scholarly critique."
10 See, e.g., Condlin, Hugger, supra note 7, at 70-81 [praising what Condlin presents as a
(lengthy) example of successful adversarial negotiating strategy (in the context of a simulated
pre-trial conference): "The parties' final agreement was pretty one-sided. By almost any standard Paine did much better than Drillco. . . . In short, through a combination of substantive
cleverness and a persistent, forceful yet flexible demeanor, they managed to be confident without being arrogant, articulate without being glib and aggressive without being belligerent. They
made it seem as though their case did not depend upon rhetorical tricks and as though they were
motivated by a commitment to client interests more than a desire to win. . . . They were deceptive, competitive, concerned almost exclusively with Paine's interests, and intent on coming away
from the conference with as much as they could get rather than finding a mutually beneficial
middle-ground solution. They were willing to exploit all of the leverage available to them. . ..
Beneath their outward appearance of reasoned elaboration lay an unvarnished desire to win. . ..
The Paine lawyers' decision to bargain in this way is easy to understand. If it is possible to win
more than an adversary, without compromising one's integrity, abusing others, corrupting legal
institutions, or making the world a more hostile place-and the Paine lawyers' behavior is evidence that it is-then it is only rational to try to do this, even if the behavior involved is not
saintly (i.e., selfless). One is usually better off with more rather than less of something valued,
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are not simply foolish, but dangerous." This commitment to adversarial methods rests, in turn, on the values and vision he holds.
He rejects (and mocks) the relational vision of human capacity and
motivation-the view that human beings have inherent capacity
and desire for both agency and empathy, and therefore flourish in
processes like transformative mediation that support these capacities. 12 He believes instead in the individualistic view that human
beings in conflict are motivated by self-interest and self-satisfaction
without any deep sense of social connection or empathy, and that
they usually require strong outside direction to do what is best for
them because they lack the capacity for self-determination. 13 In
everything else being equal; that someone felt otherwise would be the breaking news . . . the
Paine lawyers' behavior is a case study in the process of bargaining competitively without appearing to do so, and without offending."]; n. 219 ["The Paine lawyers' behavior presents a more
realistic picture of adversarial bargaining and shows how being substantively aggressive can be
socially acceptable without leaving any of the bad aftertaste communitarians decry."]; 86 ["To be
taken seriously ... bargaining theory must make room for and incorporate the sort of adversarial
maneuvering the Paine lawyers used so effectively in the Drillco pre-trial conference. It must
explain how deception, argument and self-interested trading fit within a complete theory of bargaining behavior. . . . All bargaining . . . is a lying game to some extent, and one in which

adversarial behavior plays an inevitable role. To pretend otherwise is to deny reality, actual and
imagined."]. See also Condlin, Bargaining,supra note 7, at 285 ["To be 'skillful, energetic, uncritical, and obedient instruments' of their clients' selfish ends is the essence of legal representation for many lawyers, and this view is embodied in the traditional, adversarial approach to legal
dispute bargaining."].
11 See supra notes 8 & 9, and accompanying text. The examples given there should suffice to
demonstrate the point made in the text here. It is characteristic of the weakness of Condlin's
critique that he does not distinguish between the problem-solving and transformative theories of
mediation, referring to both as "communitarian." See, e.g., Condlin, Bargaining,supra note 7, at
282-83. In fact, the two are quite distinct in both theory and practice. See Promise 1, supra note
5, at 55-77; Robert A. Baruch Bush, Mediation Skills and Client-Centered Lawyering: a New
View of the Partnership, 19 CLINICAL L.REv. 429, 433-46 (2013).
12 Regarding the relational vision and its connection to transformative mediation, see Promise 1, supra note 5, at 255-56; Promise 2, supra note 5, at 59-62, 250-56.
13 Regarding his view of human motivation, see Condlin, Hugger, supra note 7, at 83 ["Perhaps in an Hegelian spirit world, or one of Platonic forms, there would be no inclination to
prefer one's own projects over others' . . . but bargaining does not operate ...

in a spirit world.

The desire to do as well as possible for oneself is as much a feature of legal bargaining as it is of
social life generally and as such, it is a feature that any viable theory of bargaining must recognize and take into account."]; 6-7 ["[L]awyers understand something about real-life bargaining
that communitarians do not. . .. [A]n exclusively, relentlessly, or unqualifiedly communitarian
approach to bargaining is another name for eleemosynary behavior and lawyers usually want to
make deals rather than gifts.]; & fn. 246 ["[Communitarian theorists] operate on an unsophisticated, if not naive, psychology that sees self-interested competition over scarce and valuable resources as an optional feature of social and political life. They should read more Madison.
Richard Nisbett's insightful book on the 'geography of thought' shows how an individualistic and
competitive view of bargaining has its greatest explanatory power for American (or Western)
bargaining practice. . . . Nisbett shows how an individualistic focus . . . is a characteristic of

Western culture"]. Regarding his view of human capacity for self determination, see Condlin,
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short, Condlin's critique is at base an ideological one aimed at the
underlying beliefs and premises of the transformative approach to
conflict, and this explains its intensity. But instead of presenting
this critique seriously and directly, he uses clever sarcasm in an effort to trivialize the approach and make it look foolish.
We certainly understand that Condlin may disagree with relational beliefs about human nature, motivation, and capacity-beliefs that are the foundation of practice within the transformative
framework. However, his disagreement is not proof that his views
are right and that the transformative model is wrong. Nevertheless, his aggressive approach to the subject does suggest that he
perceives the relational view to be not only wrong, but also fundamentally challenging to his individualistic vision of conflict and
human nature. Condlin is certainly not the only scholar to question the viability of the relational vision and processes based on
it.14 However, the productive way of posing such questions is
through measured intellectual engagement and not hyperbole or
mockery.
Stripped of the rhetorical flourishes, Condlin's real charge
(against both us and the other ADR scholars he has criticized) is
that our foundational premises-regarding inherent human capacity and motivation for agency and empathy-are overly idealistic
and impractical. 15 Our response, in brief, is that the relational
premises about human nature are indeed highly idealistic and optimistic. However, this is not to say that these optimistic premises
have no basis in reality; in fact, there is good evidence to support
them.16 Furthermore, these premises are by no means impractical.
supra note 2, at 641-43, criticizing a mediator (in a case presented in Promise 1, supra note 5)
because he did not "protect the parties against themselves" and "force them" to do what was in
their best interests [". . . to permit them to jettison a workable alternative ... without considering what would happen if they did not agree to it, or without forcing them to consider whether
their buyers' remorse was warranted, is hard to understand. . . To let the parties dismiss this
option ... simply for the sake of empowering them, seems irresponsible.... The parties almost
certainly would have honored the alternative agreement-even if nudged into it-if later it became clear that it was their best option in a less than perfect world. Anything else would have
been irrational. . . . When parties give in to pique, resentment, spite, or some other emotion of
the moment . . . it is reasonable for them to expect a mediator to protect them against themselves.... Empowerment should be seen as a means to an end, not an end in itself; useful when
it helps parties make good decisions, but destructive when it causes them to shoot themselves in
the foot."]
14 See, e.g., Seul, supra note 1.
15 See supra notes 8, 9, & 13, for quotes from his various critiques showing that this is his
central charge against the ADR scholars he criticizes.
16 There is evidence to support an optimistic view of the human capacity and desire for both
agency and empathy. Regarding empathy, see, e.g., ALFIE KOHN, THE BRIGHTER SIDE OF
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This is the heart of a constructionist approach to social institutions,
which holds that the view we take of the world affects and constructs the world itself, negatively or positively, either limiting it or
improving it.1 7 Optimistic views can be profoundly practical because they can motivate and facilitate positive change. This is true
of the ideas behind all of the approaches that Condlin calls "communitarian" (although there are differences among these approaches that he ignores)." They envision alternative ways of
conducting conflict because they recognize positive potentials of
human capacity and motivation that he ignores or denies. This difference of vision is a genuine and legitimate disagreement on
which there can be substantive exchange. We welcome this kind of
exchange. However, we choose not to respond in depth or comprehensively to a critique that conceals its essentially ideological
argument behind a screen of exaggerated and sarcastic rhetoric.
Nevertheless, it is important to give a few examples of how
Condlin's commentary on transformative mediation distorts the
subject and misses the mark. The first example is his discussion of
the empirical research on transformative practice. 19 There has
been substantial independent research conducted on the USPS
(1990), at 4-5 ["There is good evidence to support the proposition that it is as 'natural' to help as it is to hurt, that concern for the
well-being of others cannot be reduced to self-interest, that social structures predicated on
human selfishness have no claim to inevitability-or even prudence."], 230-38 [summarizing numerous studies that provide "good evidence" of human motivation and capacity for empathy and
altruism]. Regarding agency, see, e.g., Alafair S. Burke, 81 N.C. L. REV. 211, 223-24, 237 (2002)
[discussing the evidence that battered women, rather than being victims of "learned helplessness", have both the motivation and capacity for self-determined rational choice among constrained alternatives - and indeed exercise their agency to make such choices in deciding to stay
or leave abusive relationships]. See also Robert. D. Dinerstein, Client-Centered Counseling:
Reappraisaland Refinement, 12 ARIZ. L. REV. 501, 517-44 (1990) [discussing the views of many
experts on the lawyering process that clients, including those from less educated and advantaged
groups, have the capacity for self-determined choice and agency, and will exercise that capacity if
supported by the professionals who assist them]. Interestingly, Condlin references the literature
cited by Dinerstein on the role of client agency, but seems to disregard it as evidence of the
human capacity for self-determination. See Condlin, supra note 2, at 642 & n. 91. He also references the work of Carl Rogers, and recognizes his work on humanistic psychology as an antecedent to the transformative theory, but again makes no mention of the evidence of client capacity
for agency found in Rogers' work. See id., at 629-30 & n. 46. In short, there is indeed evidence
that supports the realism and practicality of the relational vision underlying transformative theory, and Condlin simply ignores it in dismissing the vision as unrealistic and "utopian".
17 See, e.g., Kenneth J. Gergen, ConstructionistDialoguesand theVicissitudes
of the Political,
in THE PoLrrics OF CONSTRUCTIONISM (I. VELODY & R. WILLIAMS eds.), 1998; DANIEL CHANDLER, SEMIOTICS: THE BASICS (2007), regarding the social constructionist approach.
18 See supra note 11.
19 See Condlin, supra note 2, at 668-73.
HUMAN NATURE: ALTRUISM AND EMPATHY IN DAILY LIFE
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transformative mediation program, which has been published in
competitively reviewed journals by Lisa Bingham and her colleagues. 20 Bingham's intense focus on the effects and outcomes of
the USPS program make the transformative model of practice the
most researched approach to conflict intervention in the last
twenty years. Her studies followed traditional, well-established,
empirical methods for assessing parties' responses to and assessment of the mediation process and the mediators' interventions.
The research is extensive, credible, meticulous, and highly regarded. The work was also innovative in its ability to gauge the
upstream effects of parties' participation in transformative mediation. The unsubstantiated, broad-brush criticisms of her research,
in this critique, are specious and demonstrate a lack of knowledge
of standard empirical methodology.
A second example is Condlin's dismissal of nearly two decades
of work that explains and illustrates transformative mediation
practice. He belittles the "case-examples" offered in this work, implying that these examples are offered as research evidence that
the approach works. 2 1 In fact, the cases are presented not as research evidence, but rather as concrete illustrations of how transformative mediators practice and what kinds of effects their
interventions aim for. Moreover, Condlin misses one of the central
lessons of these case-examples and the overall work on the transformative approach to practice-namely, that there is a real and
important difference between mediatorcontrol of parties and mediator supportfor parties.22 His denial that this difference exists and
20 See Dorothy J. Della Noce and Hugo C.M. Prein, The Case for Transformation:A Review
of Theoretical and Empirical Support, in SOURCEBOOK, supra note 5, at 93-105 [summarizing

and referencing the multiple studies done by Bingham and her colleagues evaluating the use of
transformative mediation in the United States Postal Service's REDRESS mediation program].
21 See, e.g., Condlin, supra note 2, at 637-45, 660-68 [criticizing two central case-examples
for not providing evidence of any transformative impacts on the parties, despite the fact that the
cases are clearly not presented as evidence of impact, but as illustrations of practice]. He also
criticizes the case-studies presented because they are simulations, not real cases recorded and
transcribed for analysis. This is ironic, since the only case he presents, in his own work, as an
example of his preferred form of adversary negotiation, is a lengthy simulation of a pre-trial
conference! And this simulated case is analyzed in depth, in multiple articles, to argue in favor
of the adversary approach to negotiation. See Condlin, Hugger supra note 7, at 16-86; Condlin,
Prospecting, supra note 7, at 258-61.

22 As documented in many research studies, conventional mediators often direct and control
the process and limit party communication and decision-making. See Robert A. Baruch Bush,
Staying in Orbit or Breaking Free: The Relationship of Mediation to the Courts Over Four De-

cades, 84 N. DAKOTA. L. REv. 705, 713-14, 727-32, 735-38 (2008) [summarizing research on the
directiveness endemic in conventional mediation practice]. By contrast, also as documented in
research, transformative mediators follow and support party communication and decision-mak-
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his claim that it is unimportant are completely uninformed.2 3 His
further claim, that the "supportive" interventions of transformative
mediation are the equivalent of the mediator doing nothing and
just "waiting for the parties to take control," 2 4 is a distortion of the
specific transformative interventions described concretely in the
case-examples and taught in intensive mediation training programs.2 5 This claim is particularly insulting to the thousands of
practitioners who have mastered the proactive, non-directive intervention skills on which transformative practice is built, and who
have seen the positive impact on parties' interaction.
Finally, the critique's claim that we present the "relational"
vision as our own original work, without acknowledging any major
figures as sources, is shockingly false. 2 6 In fact, we have acknowledged since 1994 that our central construct of the balance between
regard for self and regard for other, empowerment and recognition, is based on and derived from the work of Carol Gilligan,
ing. See Della Noce & Prein, supra note 20, at 100-105 [summarizing and citing multiple studies
of transformative mediators' practice of supporting party interaction]. Regarding Condlin's
seeming to ignore or deny this difference, see Condlin, supra note 2, at 639-43 & note 83 [commenting on discussion and illustration of supportive v. directive mediator interventions in Promise 1], 647-49 & notes 110-111 [commenting on discussion of supportive but nondirective
interventions in Promise 2].
23 See Bush, supra note 11, at 433-46 [detailing the clearly different practices of facilitative
and transformative mediators, in terms of control v. support, with citations to authorities on
these two different models of mediation practice]; Robert A. Baruch Bush and Joseph P. Folger,
Mediation and Social Justice: Risks and Opportunities, 27 OHIO STATE J. ON Disp. RESOL. 1,
22-44 (2012) [analyzing the different impacts of practices of mediator control and mediator support on the goals of civility and justice as affected by mediation]. Condlin's critique notably fails
to cite either of these recent articles.
24 See Condlin, supra note 2, at 647-649.

25 See Promise 2, supra note 5, at 131-214 [case study with commentary illustrating specific
proactive mediator interventions used in transformative mediation]; Robert A. Baruch Bush and
Joseph P. Folger, Transformative Mediation: Core Practices,in SOURCEBOOK, supra note 5, at 31

[describing specific practices of transformative mediation, with examples]. Readers genuinely
interested in an accurate portrayal of transformative mediation practices should consult these
sources. Though he cites extensively to the case study noted above, Condlin omits any reference
to the detailed commentary explaining the mediator's interventions. That commentary explains
many of the interventions Condlin criticizes.
26 Condlin, supra note 2, at 626 fn. 16, 677-78 [". . . they describe the Relational Worldview
as an original conception . . . not associated with any 'big names'"] (emphasis added). Condlin's

citation is to a sentence in Promise 1, supra note 5, at 244, that states, "Because it represents an
outlook that is just emerging, the Relational worldview has no widely recognized character or
'name' as yet" (emphasis added). The misrepresentation of our statement is clear and shocking,
particularly since we state explicitly only a few pages later that ". . . we can identify works in
many different fields that not only reflect . . . this worldview but are coming together to constitute it. The account we presented earlierwas based on a number of these sources, though it is our

own construction," Promise 1, supra note 5, at 255 (emphasis added), and we then cite many
"relational thinkers" as the sources of our account. See infra note 27.
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Michael Sandel, and others. 27 We have made no claim to originality in the arena of relational theory. Instead, we have always welcomed the opportunity to acknowledge this body of work. The
cross-disciplinary contributions of relational scholars strengthened
the foundation of the transformative model and helped to explain
its alternative vision of conflict and conflict intervention. Anyone
who had read even the first edition of The Promise of Mediation
knew that this claim was false.
Our main point is this: This critique of the transformative approach to conflict intervention is simply the latest in Condlin's series of critiques of ADR generally, all of which are ideologically
driven. But we suggest that the particularly extreme and unfounded attack made in this recent article stems from the fact that
the transformative model is becoming intricately sewn into the
fabric of the mediation field, 28 and that it has placed values front
and center in a way that others in the field have not-values to
which the author of this critique is vehemently opposed.2 9 In sum,
this critique is driven by ideology; but regrettably, instead of
openly discussing the ideological dimension, Condlin resorts to
mockery, a recognized tactic used to marginalize disfavored ideologies without genuine substantive engagement.o
We certainly understand that not everyone in the mediation
field subscribes to the values and practices of the transformative
framework; however, we are confident that professionals in the
field will think through their responses to this model and decide27 See Promise 1, supra note 5, at 255-56; Promise 2, supra note 5, at 59-60, 250-58 [both
works describing the roots of the relational vision in the work of Gilligan, Sandel, and many
other thinkers in different fields].
28 There are many objective signs that, over the past fifteen years, the transformative model
has garnered an established place in the ADR field and is likely to continue to flourish, including: (1) the translation of The Promise of Mediation into seven languages, its use as the core text
in graduate programs in conflict and dispute resolution, and its record as a best seller in the
ADR field; (2) the success of numerous national and international conferences devoted to transformative practice in the US and abroad; (3) the inclusion of descriptions of transformative mediation in many law school ADR casebooks, and in major mediation texts; and (4) the
organizational, financial and interpersonal success of the US Postal Service REDRESS mediation program, as well as many programs in mediation centers that rely upon the transformative
model for addressing their cases. This momentum could be the real answer to the questions
asked about the tone of Condlin's critique. As one writer has said, "Ridicule is a public confession of fear." Attributed to Vanna Bonta, American novelist, b. 1958, author of FLIGHT.
29 Dr. Jeffrey Rubin, editor of the first edition of Promise of Mediation, predicted that "The
fact that Bush and Folger are so frankly ideological and value driven" will disturb many readers.
His prediction has been borne out, with Condlin's critique the latest and most extreme example.
See Jeffrey Z. Rubin, Foreword, in Promise 1, supra note 5, at xii.
30 See TEUN A. VAN DIJK, IDEOLOGY: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY APPROACH (1998).

2013]

RESPONSE TO CONDLIN'S CRITIQUE

241

on substantive grounds-whether and why it is, or is not, for them.
Either way, it has become part of the lasting discourse of conflict
intervention work and scholarship." We believe that future discourse about the transformative model-and about other important developments in the field-can and should be conducted in a
manner that involves civil, substantive contributions on all sides,
even when the differences involve deeply held beliefs.

31 Accepting the accomplishments and appeal of the transformative model of practice is very
difficult-perhaps threatening-for one who insists that disputes be addressed in the adversarial
mode that some experts on legal advocacy promote and provide. See supra note 10. Actually,
despite Condlin's charge that the transformative framework is "exclusivist," our work acknowledges that the legal process is a useful and sometimes necessary means to address conflict (as is
the conventional, problem-solving model of mediation). See Promise2, supra note 5, at 260-66.
We also suggest that transformative skills can be highly useful to lawyers engaged in traditional
legal advocacy, and we discuss how those skills can be used in the lawyering process. See Bush,
supra note 11, at 452-84.

